OC Vault · Security
OC Vault's security claim is unusually narrow and unusually strong: OC cannot read your data, because the architecture gives it nothing to read. This page is the honest version of that claim — what is protected, what is exposed by design, what is a user decision, and the one tradeoff you are explicitly opting into.
Implementers and researchers should also read the protocol's
SECURITY.md (opens in a new tab).
One-glance threat modelLink to this section
| Adversary | What they learn | What they cannot | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|
| OC / vault.ochk.io database access | That an identity has N encrypted blobs, each with a random id + timestamp | Entry names, types, tags, payloads — anything readable | Baked in — the double-encrypted blob (see below) |
| Network observer | You speak HTTPS to vault.ochk.io | Content (TLS) and metadata (double encryption) | — |
| Possessor of a share URL | Share ciphertext | The entry — the AES key lives in the URL fragment only | Send the link over a channel only the recipient has |
| Possessor of a team invite URL | From a copied link, the team key. From an emailed link, the key sealed under a one-time code | The personal vaults of any member. The key in an emailed link, without its code | Send a copied link over a channel only the recipient has — same rule as share URLs. Send invite emails only the sealed key; you tell the invitee the code another way. See Teams |
| Stolen unlocked browser | Full decrypted vault | — | Auto-lock; OS disk encryption; lock before stepping away |
| Stolen locked / signed-out browser | Ciphertext at rest in IndexedDB | Plaintext — re-opening takes the passphrase, the recovery code or a passkey you set up; a session cookie alone opens nothing | Auto-lock; sign out on shared machines. With Stay unlocked on this device on, a browser closed without a lock re-opens the vault without the passphrase |
| Someone who takes over your sign-in | Can sign in as you and fetch your ciphertext and wrapped vault key | Open them: that takes your passphrase or recovery code | A strong passphrase; the recovery code kept offline |
| Lost passphrase and recovery code, no backup file | — | — | None — the entries are gone. This is by design. |
What is sealedLink to this section
- Every entry payload — AES-256-GCM under the vault key, with a fresh 12-byte nonce per write.
- All entry metadata in the cloud — entry name, type, tags and timestamps
are wrapped a second time before upload. OC's blob store sees only a random
16-byte envelope id and an
updated_atvalue. See Protocol → double-encrypted blob. - The vault key itself — 32 random bytes. OC holds it only wrapped under your passphrase and under your recovery code (scrypt, then AES-256-GCM), and, while you link a device, sealed to that device's key. It cannot open any of them.
What is exposed by designLink to this section
Honesty matters more than a clean table:
- Local metadata, locally. In your own browser's IndexedDB, entry
name,typeandtagsare stored in clear so the dashboard can search and filter them instantly. They are sealed before they ever leave the device — but a process with read access to your browser profile sees them. - Payment status. OC necessarily knows whether an identity has paid for cloud sync, when, and which tier. That is billing, not vault content.
- Blob count and timing. With cloud sync on, OC can see that you have some number of encrypted blobs and when each last changed. It cannot see what any of them are.
- Your Bitcoin address. It is your identifier with the auth host. Using an address with no on-chain history avoids linking the vault to a balance.
- Bound browsers, if you opt in. Binding a browser under Settings → Devices publishes a public record on five Nostr relays that links your Bitcoin address to that browser's key, and those relays see your IP address. See the Bitcoin device tier.
- What a
.lockexport holds. It opens on every device it lists without your vault passphrase, and it names your Bitcoin address. Revoke a device you no longer hold before you export. See Signed .lock export.
The recovery tradeoff — read this twiceLink to this section
There is no passphrase reset and no recovery backdoor. orangecheck holds your vault key only wrapped under your passphrase and your recovery code, and can open neither. If you lose both and have no encrypted backup file, your entries are permanently unrecoverable. OC cannot help. Losing your sign-in is different: recover it like any login; it only fetches ciphertext.
This is the cost of the core guarantee. A vendor that can recover your data for you can also be compelled, or breached, into surrendering it. OC Vault chose the other side of that trade. Mitigate it deliberately:
- Keep the recovery code offline. It is the only way in without the passphrase.
- Make an encrypted backup from settings: your vault key and every entry under a passphrase you choose. Import on vault.ochk.io restores it in any browser.
Breach checking · k-anonymityLink to this section
The optional breach scan on the vault health (opens in a new tab) page checks passwords against the Have I Been Pwned corpus without telling HIBP which password — or which user — is being checked:
- The password is SHA-1 hashed locally. (SHA-1 is used purely as a lookup key into HIBP's index — it protects nothing.)
- Only the first five hex characters of that hash are sent.
- HIBP returns every breached-hash suffix sharing that prefix — hundreds of them — and the match is found locally.
- The request carries
Add-Padding, so the response size leaks nothing either.
This is the same mechanism 1Password's Watchtower and Bitwarden's reports use. The scan never runs unless you explicitly click it. The rest of the health audit — reused and weak detection — is entirely offline.
Operational hardening you controlLink to this section
- Auto-lock — set an idle timeout in settings; on expiry the vault locks without a reload: the vault key is dropped and every decrypted value is cleared.
- Clipboard auto-clear — a copied secret is wiped from the OS clipboard after a configurable delay (default 30 s).
- Conceal previews — keep TOTP codes and entry previews masked until explicitly revealed, to defeat shoulder-surfing.
- Lock before you walk away — press
l, or use the lock button in settings, on any shared machine.
ReportingLink to this section
Security issues in the vault client or the underlying protocol go to the
orangecheck disclosure process — see
oc-lock-protocol/SECURITY.md (opens in a new tab).